On the Impossibility of Cryptography with Tamperable Randomness

Per Austrin, Kai Min Chung, Mohammad Mahmoody, Rafael Pass, Karn Seth

פרסום מחקרי: פרסום בכתב עתמאמרביקורת עמיתים

תקציר

We initiate a study of the security of cryptographic primitives in the presence of efficient tampering attacks to the randomness of honest parties. More precisely, we consider p-tampering attackers that may efficiently tamper with each bit of the honest parties’ random tape with probability p, but have to do so in an “online” fashion. Our main result is a strong negative result: We show that any secure encryption scheme, bit commitment scheme, or zero-knowledge protocol can be “broken” with advantage Ω (p) by a p-tampering attacker. The core of this result is a new algorithm for biasing the output of bounded-value functions, which may be of independent interest. We also show that this result cannot be extended to primitives such as signature schemes and identification protocols: assuming the existence of one-way functions, such primitives can be made resilient to [InlineEquation not available: see fulltext.]-tampering attacks where n is the security parameter.

שפה מקוריתאנגלית
עמודים (מ-עד)1052-1101
מספר עמודים50
כתב עתAlgorithmica
כרך79
מספר גיליון4
מזהי עצם דיגיטלי (DOIs)
סטטוס פרסוםפורסם - 1 דצמ׳ 2017
פורסם באופן חיצוניכן

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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