Limits of efficiency in sequential auctions

Michal Feldman, Brendan Lucier, Vasilis Syrgkanis

פרסום מחקרי: פרק בספר / בדוח / בכנספרסום בספר כנסביקורת עמיתים


We study the efficiency of sequential first-price item auctions at (subgame perfect) equilibrium. This auction format has recently attracted much attention, with previous work establishing positive results for unit-demand valuations and negative results for submodular valuations. This leaves a large gap in our understanding between these valuation classes. In this work we resolve this gap on the negative side. In particular, we show that even in the very restricted case in which each bidder has either an additive valuation or a unit-demand valuation, there exist instances in which the inefficiency at equilibrium grows linearly with the minimum of the number of items and the number of bidders. Moreover, these inefficient equilibria persist even under iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies. Our main result implies linear inefficiency for many natural settings, including auctions with gross substitute valuations, capacitated valuations, budget-additive valuations, and additive valuations with hard budget constraints on the payments. For capacitated valuations, our results imply a lower bound that equals the maximum capacity of any bidder, which is tight following the upper-bound technique established by Paes Leme et al. [20].

שפה מקוריתאנגלית
כותר פרסום המארחWeb and Internet Economics - 9th International Conference, WINE 2013, Proceedings
מספר עמודים14
מזהי עצם דיגיטלי (DOIs)
סטטוס פרסוםפורסם - 2013
פורסם באופן חיצוניכן
אירוע9th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics, WINE 2013 - Cambridge, MA, ארצות הברית
משך הזמן: 11 דצמ׳ 201314 דצמ׳ 2013

סדרות פרסומים

שםLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
כרך8289 LNCS


כנס9th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics, WINE 2013
מדינה/אזורארצות הברית
עירCambridge, MA

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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  • ???subjectarea.asjc.1700.1700???

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