X-games

Kfir Eliaz; Ran Spiegler

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2014.12.005

X-games

Kfir Eliaz, Ran Spiegler

School of Economics

Tel Aviv University

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

What is common to the following situations: designing random incentive schemes to implement team effort, monopoly pricing when consumers are loss averse, arms races when players are privately informed of their armament costs? We present a simple formalism, called X-games, which captures these situations as well as others, and use it to unify and extend the separate analyses that they received in the literature.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	93-100
Number of pages	8
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	89
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.12.005
State	Published - 1 Jan 2015

Keywords

C72
Externalities
Strategic complements
Strategic substitutes

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

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10.1016/j.geb.2014.12.005

Cite this

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title = "X-games",

abstract = "What is common to the following situations: designing random incentive schemes to implement team effort, monopoly pricing when consumers are loss averse, arms races when players are privately informed of their armament costs? We present a simple formalism, called X-games, which captures these situations as well as others, and use it to unify and extend the separate analyses that they received in the literature.",

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doi = "10.1016/j.geb.2014.12.005",

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AB - What is common to the following situations: designing random incentive schemes to implement team effort, monopoly pricing when consumers are loss averse, arms races when players are privately informed of their armament costs? We present a simple formalism, called X-games, which captures these situations as well as others, and use it to unify and extend the separate analyses that they received in the literature.

KW - C72

KW - Externalities

KW - Strategic complements

KW - Strategic substitutes

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DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2014.12.005

M3 - مقالة

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VL - 89

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EP - 100

JO - Games and Economic Behavior

JF - Games and Economic Behavior

ER -

X-games

Abstract

Keywords

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

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