Abstract
The growing reliance of the US Supreme Court on unexplained orders, commonly known as
their ‘shadow docket’, has emerged as a major concern, generating strong criticism for undermining the traditional expectation that judges provide detailed justifications for their rulings.
Without presuming to take a stance on the legitimacy of shadow dockets or the motivations
that inform them, the increasing reliance on unexplained orders encourages a re-evaluation
of the role and function of judicial reasoning within the broader spectrum of case law. This
article re-examines the assumption that providing reasons for judicial judgments is inherently
and universally desirable. It explores how providing reasons can sometimes conflict with other
fundamental values underlying the legal process and argues for considering limits on judicial
reasoning that extend beyond pragmatic concerns related to judicial economy (efficient management of judicial resources). The article highlights three key areas where such limits on
reason-giving might be warranted. First, witness credibility assessments, in which the verbal
articulation of the underlying reasons might distort the decision-making process. Secondly,
‘hard cases’, in which the risk of crafting detrimental precedents suggests a need to separate
the resolution of specific cases from the development of broader legal doctrines, as illustrated
by the US Supreme Court’s handling of Bush v Gore. Thirdly, situations in which judicial
silence speaks louder than the articulation of reasons and can serve as a catalyst for democratic
deliberation, as manifested in the Supreme Court’s handling of the 2014 same-sex marriage
cases. Rather than advocating for Aristotelian intuition-based adjudication (where a judge’s
practical wisdom (phronesis) and cultivated sense of justice guide decisions, sometimes beyond explicit legal rules), the article emphasises the need to balance the benefits of judicial
reason-giving with an awareness of its limitations and proposes a more strategic and deliberate
approach to providing reasoned judgments
their ‘shadow docket’, has emerged as a major concern, generating strong criticism for undermining the traditional expectation that judges provide detailed justifications for their rulings.
Without presuming to take a stance on the legitimacy of shadow dockets or the motivations
that inform them, the increasing reliance on unexplained orders encourages a re-evaluation
of the role and function of judicial reasoning within the broader spectrum of case law. This
article re-examines the assumption that providing reasons for judicial judgments is inherently
and universally desirable. It explores how providing reasons can sometimes conflict with other
fundamental values underlying the legal process and argues for considering limits on judicial
reasoning that extend beyond pragmatic concerns related to judicial economy (efficient management of judicial resources). The article highlights three key areas where such limits on
reason-giving might be warranted. First, witness credibility assessments, in which the verbal
articulation of the underlying reasons might distort the decision-making process. Secondly,
‘hard cases’, in which the risk of crafting detrimental precedents suggests a need to separate
the resolution of specific cases from the development of broader legal doctrines, as illustrated
by the US Supreme Court’s handling of Bush v Gore. Thirdly, situations in which judicial
silence speaks louder than the articulation of reasons and can serve as a catalyst for democratic
deliberation, as manifested in the Supreme Court’s handling of the 2014 same-sex marriage
cases. Rather than advocating for Aristotelian intuition-based adjudication (where a judge’s
practical wisdom (phronesis) and cultivated sense of justice guide decisions, sometimes beyond explicit legal rules), the article emphasises the need to balance the benefits of judicial
reason-giving with an awareness of its limitations and proposes a more strategic and deliberate
approach to providing reasoned judgments
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 1-24 |
| Number of pages | 24 |
| Journal | Cambridge Law Review |
| Volume | 10 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| State | Published - 2025 |
Keywords
- constitutional dialogue
- hard case
- procedural justice
- reasoned judgments
- shadow docket