Abstract
Liberal economists are known to be one of the driving forces behind economic liberalisation in various countries, but how did they become so politically influential? Constructivists generally suggest that during economic crises liberal economists persuaded decision-makers to adopt pro-market policy ideas as solutions for economic turbulence. While this answer is true, it is also only partial because it disregards the role played by governance-related ideas and institutional entrepreneurship in the political actions of liberal economists. I argue that ideas regarding decision-making mechanisms provided liberal economists with the basis for creatively exploiting pre-liberalisation institutions, such as central banks and central budget offices, through which these economists enhanced their long-term political influence. An in-depth examination of a paradigmatic case of economic liberalisation driven by liberal economists – Israel's Stabilisation Plan – exemplifies that argument. The existence of like-minded economists and similar pre-liberalisation policy-making institutions in many other countries hints that the Israeli experience is not unique.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 924-941 |
Number of pages | 18 |
Journal | New Political Economy |
Volume | 20 |
Issue number | 6 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 2 Nov 2015 |
Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- Israel
- constructivism
- constructivist institutionalism
- discursive institutionalism
- economic liberalization
- economics
- neoliberlism
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Geography, Planning and Development
- Development
- Political Science and International Relations