Walrasian equilibrium with few buyers

Meir Reshef; Moshe Tennenholtz

doi:10.1007/978-3-662-44803-8_15

Walrasian equilibrium with few buyers

Meir Reshef, Moshe Tennenholtz

Technion - Israel Institute of Technology

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We study the existence and the properties of Walrasian equilibrium (WEQ) in combinatorial auctions, under two natural classes of valuation functions. The first class is based on additive capacities or weights, and the second on the influence in a social network. While neither class holds the gross substitutes condition, we show that in both classes the existence of WEQ is guaranteed under certain restrictions, and in particular when there are only two competing buyers.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	170-181
Number of pages	12
Journal	Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume	8768
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-44803-8_15
State	Published - 2014

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Theoretical Computer Science
General Computer Science

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10.1007/978-3-662-44803-8_15

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abstract = "We study the existence and the properties of Walrasian equilibrium (WEQ) in combinatorial auctions, under two natural classes of valuation functions. The first class is based on additive capacities or weights, and the second on the influence in a social network. While neither class holds the gross substitutes condition, we show that in both classes the existence of WEQ is guaranteed under certain restrictions, and in particular when there are only two competing buyers.",

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JO - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

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ER -

Walrasian equilibrium with few buyers

Abstract

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

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