The Winner Does Not Take All: Lessons from the Israel-Hamas Conflict

Gadi Hitman

doi:https://doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12703

The Winner Does Not Take All: Lessons from the Israel-Hamas Conflict

Gadi Hitman

Middle Eastern Studies

Ariel University

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

Despite countless studies on victory in armed conflict, scholars disagree about the exact meaning of this term. This article, using primary sources in Hebrew and Arabic, aims to define victory and to discern between types of successful outcomes in war. We analyze three case studies of military collision between Israel and Hamas through a model featuring four levels: tactical, operational, strategic, and systemic. The study shows that in all three clashes (2008, 2012, 2014), the outcomes are difficult to evaluate because the boundaries between the definitions are foggy. It also concludes that neither side has achieved a strategic victory that breaks the status quo that has held since June 2007—though Hamas's leaders have claimed strategic victory due to the group's survival. Israel, without advanced planning, has relied on tactical wins for its strategic policy.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	24-36
Number of pages	13
Journal	Middle East Policy
Volume	30
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12703
State	Published - 1 Sep 2023

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Sociology and Political Science
Political Science and International Relations

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abstract = "Despite countless studies on victory in armed conflict, scholars disagree about the exact meaning of this term. This article, using primary sources in Hebrew and Arabic, aims to define victory and to discern between types of successful outcomes in war. We analyze three case studies of military collision between Israel and Hamas through a model featuring four levels: tactical, operational, strategic, and systemic. The study shows that in all three clashes (2008, 2012, 2014), the outcomes are difficult to evaluate because the boundaries between the definitions are foggy. It also concludes that neither side has achieved a strategic victory that breaks the status quo that has held since June 2007—though Hamas's leaders have claimed strategic victory due to the group's survival. Israel, without advanced planning, has relied on tactical wins for its strategic policy.",

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The Winner Does Not Take All: Lessons from the Israel-Hamas Conflict

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