The truth behind the myth of the folk theorem

Joseph Y. Halpern, Rafael Pass, Lior Seeman

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

Abstract

We study the problem of computing an ε-Nash equilibrium in repeated games. Earlier work by Borgs et al. [2010] suggests that this problem is intractable. We show that if we make a slight change to their model - modeling the players as polynomial-time Turing machines that maintain state (rather than stateless polynomial-time Turing machines) - and make some standard cryptographic hardness assumptions (the existence of public-key encryption), the problem can actually be solved in polynomial time.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationITCS 2014 - Proceedings of the 2014 Conference on Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science
PublisherAssociation for Computing Machinery
Pages543-552
Number of pages10
ISBN (Print)9781450322430
DOIs
StatePublished - 2014
Externally publishedYes
Event2014 5th Conference on Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science, ITCS 2014 - Princeton, NJ, United States
Duration: 12 Jan 201414 Jan 2014

Publication series

NameITCS 2014 - Proceedings of the 2014 Conference on Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science

Conference

Conference2014 5th Conference on Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science, ITCS 2014
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityPrinceton, NJ
Period12/01/1414/01/14

Keywords

  • Computing Nash equilibrium
  • Folk theorem
  • Repeated games

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Computational Theory and Mathematics

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