The tennis coach problem: A game-theoretic and experimental study

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Abstract

The paper introduces a new allocation game, related to Blotto games: each tennis coach assigns his four different skilled players to four positions, and then each team plays all other teams in the tournament. The winning team is the one with the highest total score.The set of equilibria is characterized and experimental behavior in variants of the game is analyzed in light of an adapted level-k model which is based on an appealing specification of the starting point (Level-0). The results exhibit a systematic pattern- a majority of the subjects used a small number of strategies. However, although level-k thinking is naturally specified in this context, only a limited use of (low) level-k thinking was found. These findings differ from those obtained in previous studies, which found high frequencies of level-k reasoning among subjects in various games. Thus, the results illuminate some bounds of the level-k approach.

Original languageEnglish
Article number10
JournalB.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
Volume12
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - 2012

Keywords

  • colonel Blotto
  • experimental game theory
  • level-k thinking
  • tennis coach problem

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)
  • General Economics,Econometrics and Finance

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