The strategic value of recall

Ron Peretz

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2011.05.013

The strategic value of recall

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

This work studies the value of two-person zero-sum repeated games in which at least one of the players is restricted to (mixtures of) bounded recall strategies. A (pure) k-recall strategy is a strategy that relies only on the last k periods of history. This work improves previous results (Lehrer, 1988; Neyman and Okada, 2009) on repeated games with bounded recall. We provide an explicit formula for the asymptotic value of the repeated game as a function of the one-stage game, the duration of the repeated game, and the recall of the agents.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	332-351
Number of pages	20
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	74
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.05.013
State	Published - Jan 2012
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

Bounded memory
Bounded rationality
Bounded recall
De Bruijn sequences
Entropy
Repeated games

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

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10.1016/j.geb.2011.05.013

Cite this

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title = "The strategic value of recall",

abstract = "This work studies the value of two-person zero-sum repeated games in which at least one of the players is restricted to (mixtures of) bounded recall strategies. A (pure) k-recall strategy is a strategy that relies only on the last k periods of history. This work improves previous results (Lehrer, 1988; Neyman and Okada, 2009) on repeated games with bounded recall. We provide an explicit formula for the asymptotic value of the repeated game as a function of the one-stage game, the duration of the repeated game, and the recall of the agents.",

keywords = "Bounded memory, Bounded rationality, Bounded recall, De Bruijn sequences, Entropy, Repeated games",

author = "Ron Peretz",

note = "Funding Information: E-mail address: [email protected]. 1 Research done during Ph.D. studies in the Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University of Jerusalem and in Tel-Aviv University. Research supported in part by Israel Science Foundation grants 263/03 and 212/09 and by the Google Inter-university center for Electronic Markets and Auctions. 2 In Aumann{\textquoteright}s model each player observes the actions of the other players but not her own. In this paper each player observes the actions of any other player including her own. Note that the two models are not equivalent (in the presence of bounded recall).",

year = "2012",

month = jan,

doi = "10.1016/j.geb.2011.05.013",

language = "الإنجليزيّة",

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N2 - This work studies the value of two-person zero-sum repeated games in which at least one of the players is restricted to (mixtures of) bounded recall strategies. A (pure) k-recall strategy is a strategy that relies only on the last k periods of history. This work improves previous results (Lehrer, 1988; Neyman and Okada, 2009) on repeated games with bounded recall. We provide an explicit formula for the asymptotic value of the repeated game as a function of the one-stage game, the duration of the repeated game, and the recall of the agents.

AB - This work studies the value of two-person zero-sum repeated games in which at least one of the players is restricted to (mixtures of) bounded recall strategies. A (pure) k-recall strategy is a strategy that relies only on the last k periods of history. This work improves previous results (Lehrer, 1988; Neyman and Okada, 2009) on repeated games with bounded recall. We provide an explicit formula for the asymptotic value of the repeated game as a function of the one-stage game, the duration of the repeated game, and the recall of the agents.

KW - Bounded memory

KW - Bounded rationality

KW - Bounded recall

KW - De Bruijn sequences

KW - Entropy

KW - Repeated games

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DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2011.05.013

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SP - 332

EP - 351

JO - Games and Economic Behavior

JF - Games and Economic Behavior

IS - 1

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The strategic value of recall

Abstract

Keywords

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

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