The socially acceptable scoring rule

Muhammad Mahajne, Oscar Volij

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

We say that an alternative is socially acceptable if the number of individuals that rank it among their most preferred half of the alternatives is at least as large as the number of individuals that rank it among the least preferred half. We show that there exists a unique scoring rule that always selects a subset of socially acceptable alternatives.

Original languageAmerican English
Pages (from-to)223-233
Number of pages11
JournalSocial Choice and Welfare
Volume51
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Aug 2018

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics

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