Abstract
The Russo-Japanese War was fought during 1904-1905 between Tsarist Russia and Imperial Japan. The war broke out due to their conflicting interests in the Korean Peninsula and the north-eastern region of China, known then as Manchuria. Both saw the conflict as a zero-sum game in which compromise was a temporary solution. Japan’s objectives were the control of Korea, the seizure of southern Manchuria and the conclusion of the conflict with a peace agreement that would ensure its own long-term presence and interests in Korea and China. Russia’s objectives were the inverse of Japan’s and included the control of Manchuria, seizure of Korea and the expansion of its political and economic sphere to play a pivotal role in the entire region. Japan had far more limited resources and manpower, but it could mobilise its armed forces more quickly and gain the upper hand in the region, at least initially. As an island country, Japan had to control the seas from the outset and limit the duration of the war. The war lasted seventeen months but demonstrated that when strategic objectives are carefully defined and meticulously executed, as was the case with Japan, then the prima facie weaker party may win.
Original language | American English |
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Title of host publication | The Cambridge History of Strategy |
Subtitle of host publication | Volume II From the Napoleonic Wars to the Present |
Publisher | Cambridge University Press |
Pages | 122-141 |
Number of pages | 20 |
Volume | 2 |
ISBN (Electronic) | 9781108801546 |
ISBN (Print) | 9781108479929 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 1 Jan 2025 |
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- General Arts and Humanities
- General Social Sciences