The Proto-Ethical Dimension of Moods

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterpeer-review

Abstract

The concept of proto-ethics is missing in ethical theory. It refers to a domain that is evaluative in an ethically-relevant sense, but falls short of moral prescriptivity. In this paper I explore the characteristics of the proto-ethical with an emphasis on the role of mood and affect, especially with reference to Heidegger’s concept of attunement (Befiendlichkeit). I explain the sense in which the moody aspect of human existence forms necessary (but insufficient) conditions for the possibility and intelligibility of ethics.

Original languageAmerican English
Title of host publicationContributions To Phenomenology
PublisherSpringer Nature
Pages173-184
Number of pages12
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Jan 2011
Externally publishedYes

Publication series

NameContributions To Phenomenology
Volume63

Keywords

  • Ethical Judgment
  • Evaluative Dimension
  • Human Dignity
  • Moral Judgment
  • Ontological Structure

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Philosophy
  • History and Philosophy of Science

Cite this