Abstract
There has been much debate over the value of naked statistical evidence (NSE). However, while most scholars agree that it is problematic to base a verdict on NSE, they disagree on why it is problematic, pointing to different characteristics of NSE as the root of the problem. In the last decade, the debate has been energized by publications that propose a number of new approaches. This chapter joins the most recent debates on NSE—in particular, the objections to naked statistics based upon sensitivity, normalcy, incentives for lawful conduct, and free will. The authors argue that the problem of NSE is not an epistemic one, as some assume, but is actually a moral problem.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | Philosophical Foundations of Evidence Law |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press |
| Pages | 332-346 |
| Number of pages | 15 |
| ISBN (Electronic) | 9780198859307 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - 1 Jan 2021 |
Keywords
- admissibility
- free will
- incentive
- knowledge
- normalcy
- prison riot case
- probability
- sensitivity
- standard of proof
- statistical evidence
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- General Social Sciences