The primary (dis)function of consciousness: (Non)Integration

Liad Mudrik

doi:10.1017/S0140525X15002198

The primary (dis)function of consciousness: (Non)Integration

Liad Mudrik

School of Psychological Sciences

Tel Aviv University

Research output: Contribution to journal › Review article › peer-review

Abstract

Morsella et al. put forward an interesting theory about the functions of consciousness. However, I argue that this theory is more about showing what is not the function of consciousness, and claiming that it does not integrate, than vice versa - as opposed to its proclaimed goal. In addition, the question of phenomenality and its relations with integration is still left open.

Original language	English
Article number	e168
Journal	Behavioral and Brain Sciences
Volume	39
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X15002198
State	Published - 24 Nov 2016

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Neuropsychology and Physiological Psychology
Physiology
Behavioral Neuroscience

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abstract = "Morsella et al. put forward an interesting theory about the functions of consciousness. However, I argue that this theory is more about showing what is not the function of consciousness, and claiming that it does not integrate, than vice versa - as opposed to its proclaimed goal. In addition, the question of phenomenality and its relations with integration is still left open.",

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The primary (dis)function of consciousness: (Non)Integration

Abstract

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

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