The Logic of Backward Induction

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterpeer-review


Call a perfect information (PI) game simple if each player moves just once. Call a player rational if he never takes an action while believing, with probability 1, that a different action would yield him a higher payoff. Using syntactic logic, we show that an outcome of a simple PI game is consistent with common strong belief of rationality iff it is a backward induction outcome. The result also applies to general PI games in which a player's agents act independently, rendering forward inferences invalid.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationWorld Scientific Series in Economic Theory
EditorsRobert J Aumann
PublisherWorld Scientific
Number of pages35
StatePublished - 1 Dec 2023

Publication series

NameWorld Scientific Series in Economic Theory

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty
  • Applied Mathematics
  • Statistics and Probability


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