TY - GEN
T1 - The IPS compiler
T2 - 31st Annual International Cryptology Conference, CRYPTO 2011
AU - Lindell, Yehuda
AU - Oxman, Eli
AU - Pinkas, Benny
N1 - Funding Information: Research generously supported by the European Research Council as part of the ERC project LAST. The first author was also supported by the israel science foundation (grant No. 781/07).
PY - 2011
Y1 - 2011
N2 - In recent work, Ishai, Prabhakaran and Sahai (CRYPTO 2008) presented a new compiler (hereafter the IPS compiler) for constructing protocols that are secure in the presence of malicious adversaries without an honest majority, from protocols that are only secure in the presence of semi-honest adversaries. The IPS compiler has many important properties: it provides a radically different way of obtaining security in the presence of malicious adversaries with no honest majority, it is black-box in the underlying semi-honest protocol, and it has excellent asymptotic efficiency. In this paper, we study the IPS compiler from a number of different angles. We present an efficiency improvement of the "watchlist setup phase" of the compiler that also facilitates a simpler and tighter analysis of the cheating probability. In addition, we present a conceptually simpler variant that uses protocols that are secure in the presence of covert adversaries as its basic building block. This variant can be used to achieve more efficient asymptotic security, as we show regarding black-box constructions of malicious oblivious transfer from semi-honest oblivious transfer. In addition, it deepens our understanding of the model of security in the presence of covert adversaries. Finally, we analyze the IPS compiler from a concrete efficiency perspective and demonstrate that in some cases it can be competitive with the best efficient protocols currently known.
AB - In recent work, Ishai, Prabhakaran and Sahai (CRYPTO 2008) presented a new compiler (hereafter the IPS compiler) for constructing protocols that are secure in the presence of malicious adversaries without an honest majority, from protocols that are only secure in the presence of semi-honest adversaries. The IPS compiler has many important properties: it provides a radically different way of obtaining security in the presence of malicious adversaries with no honest majority, it is black-box in the underlying semi-honest protocol, and it has excellent asymptotic efficiency. In this paper, we study the IPS compiler from a number of different angles. We present an efficiency improvement of the "watchlist setup phase" of the compiler that also facilitates a simpler and tighter analysis of the cheating probability. In addition, we present a conceptually simpler variant that uses protocols that are secure in the presence of covert adversaries as its basic building block. This variant can be used to achieve more efficient asymptotic security, as we show regarding black-box constructions of malicious oblivious transfer from semi-honest oblivious transfer. In addition, it deepens our understanding of the model of security in the presence of covert adversaries. Finally, we analyze the IPS compiler from a concrete efficiency perspective and demonstrate that in some cases it can be competitive with the best efficient protocols currently known.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=80052009576&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/978-3-642-22792-9_15
DO - 10.1007/978-3-642-22792-9_15
M3 - منشور من مؤتمر
SN - 9783642227912
T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
SP - 259
EP - 276
BT - Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 2011 - 31st Annual Cryptology Conference, Proceedings
PB - Springer Verlag
Y2 - 14 August 2011 through 18 August 2011
ER -