This research empirically examines the common assumption in scholarly literature that a military stratagem leads to an advantage on battlefields. It focuses on three different forms of stratagem: (1) surprise, (2) deception, and (3) special tactics. We took the battles for the Mount Hermon outpost during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war as our case studies. Constructing an independent measures design, or a between-groups design, we treated the Golani Brigade (in a set of two battles), and the 317 Paratroopers Brigade (in another battle), as two separate groups of participants–one experiencing the use of stratagems and one avoiding this condition. Our analysis shows that stratagems prove to be highly effective; however, we also raise some reservations, calling for any generalisation to be taken with a grain of salt. This research can serve as a model for future examinations of other military campaigns throughout history.
- 1973 Arab-Israeli war
- between-groups design
- independent measures design
- Mount Hermon
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Geography, Planning and Development
- Political Science and International Relations