The hazards and benefits of condescension in social learning

Itai Arieli; Yakov Babichenko; Stephan Müller; Farzad Pourbabaee; Omer Tamuz

doi:https://doi.org/10.3982/TE5743

The hazards and benefits of condescension in social learning

Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Stephan Müller, Farzad Pourbabaee, Omer Tamuz

Data and Decision Sciences

Technion - Israel Institute of Technology

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

In a misspecified social learning setting, agents are condescending if they perceive their peers as having private information that is of lower quality than it is in reality. Applying this to a standard sequential model, we show that outcomes improve when agents are mildly condescending. In contrast, too much condescension leads to worse outcomes, as does anti-condescension.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	27-56
Number of pages	30
Journal	Theoretical Economics
Volume	20
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.3982/TE5743
State	Published - Jan 2025

Keywords

D830
Social learning

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

General Economics,Econometrics and Finance

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https://doi.org/10.3982/TE5743

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The hazards and benefits of condescension in social learning

Abstract

Keywords

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

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