The Epistemology Of Ordinary Objects: How To Deflate The Debunker

According to an influential line of argument, our beliefs about which material objects exist were influenced by selective pressures that are insensitive to the true ontology of material objects, and are therefore debunked (Merricks 2001; Korman 2014, 2015; Rose and Schaffer 2017). Extant responses to this line of reasoning presuppose controversial philosophical theses, such as anti-realism about material objects, theism, or a special faculty of apprehension. The present paper develops a novel strategy for responding to debunking arguments against belief in ordinary objects, which I call ‘semi-deflationism’: our beliefs about which material objects exist are the consequents of conditional statements that we are a priori entitled to believe and whose antecedents we have empirical justification to believe. Semi-deflationism offers an attractive epistemology of material objects. It also shares certain similarities with Amie Thomasson’s (2007, 2015) analytic deflationism, but it is immune to several difficulties with it. Most importantly, semi-deflationism doesn’t imply that seemingly difficult debates about the ontology of material objects can be trivially settled, and it leaves open the possibility that although our beliefs about which objects exist are rational, they are ultimately undermined by substantive arguments for revisionary views.