The cascade auction - A mechanism for deterring collusion in auctions

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

Abstract

We introduce a sealed bid auction of a single item in which the winner is chosen at random among the highest k bidders according to a fixed probability distribution, and the price for the chosen winner is the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves price. We call such an auction a cascade auction. Our analysis suggests that this type of auction may give higher revenues compared to second price auction in cases of collusion.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 27th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2013
Pages313-319
Number of pages7
StatePublished - 2013
Event27th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2013 - Bellevue, WA, United States
Duration: 14 Jul 201318 Jul 2013

Publication series

NameProceedings of the 27th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2013

Conference

Conference27th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2013
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityBellevue, WA
Period14/07/1318/07/13

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Artificial Intelligence

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