@inproceedings{079013d35e844508af12785ec3bf1974,
title = "The cascade auction - A mechanism for deterring collusion in auctions",
abstract = "We introduce a sealed bid auction of a single item in which the winner is chosen at random among the highest k bidders according to a fixed probability distribution, and the price for the chosen winner is the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves price. We call such an auction a cascade auction. Our analysis suggests that this type of auction may give higher revenues compared to second price auction in cases of collusion.",
author = "Uriel Feige and Gil Kalai and Moshe Tennenholtz",
year = "2013",
language = "الإنجليزيّة",
isbn = "9781577356158",
series = "Proceedings of the 27th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2013",
pages = "313--319",
booktitle = "Proceedings of the 27th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2013",
note = "27th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2013 ; Conference date: 14-07-2013 Through 18-07-2013",
}