Abstract

We consider a simple simultaneous first price auction for two identical items in a complete information setting. Our goal is to analyze this setting for a simple, yet highly interesting, AND-OR game, where one agent is single minded and the other is unit demand. We find a mixed equilibrium of this game and show that every other equilibrium admits the same expected allocation and payments. In addition, we study the equilibrium, highlighting the change in revenue and social welfare as a function of the players' valuations.

Original languageEnglish
Article number1
JournalACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
Volume5
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Nov 2016

Keywords

  • AND player
  • Auctions
  • Equilibrium
  • F. [theory of computation]: algorithmic game theory and mechanism design/market equilibriums
  • Theory

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Computer Science (miscellaneous)
  • Statistics and Probability
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Marketing
  • Computational Mathematics

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'The AND-OR game'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this