@inproceedings{7098d88bc07043ebbdef8b74682c3acb,
title = "Supply-limiting mechanisms",
abstract = "Most results in revenue-maximizing auction design hinge on {"}getting the price right{"} - offering goods to bidders at a price low enough to encourage a sale, but high enough to garner non-trivial revenue. Getting the price right can be hard work, especially when the seller has little or no a priori information about bidders' valuations. A simple alternative approach is to {"}let the market do the work{"}, and have prices emerge from competition for scarce goods. The simplest-imaginable implementation of this idea is the following: first, if necessary, impose an artificial limit on the number of goods that can be sold; second, run the welfare-maximizing VCG mechanism subject to this limit. We prove that such {"}supply-limiting mechanisms{"} achieve near-optimal expected revenue in a range of single- and multi-parameter Bayesian settings. Indeed, despite their simplicity, we prove that they essentially match the state-of-the-art in prior-independent mechanism design.",
keywords = "mechanism design, prior-independence, revenue optimization",
author = "Tim Roughgarden and Inbal Talgam-Cohen and Qiqi Yan",
year = "2012",
doi = "10.1145/2229012.2229077",
language = "الإنجليزيّة",
isbn = "9781450314152",
series = "Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce",
pages = "844--861",
booktitle = "EC '12 - Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce",
note = "13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, EC '12 ; Conference date: 04-06-2012 Through 08-06-2012",
}