TY - GEN
T1 - Strong and weak acyclicity in iterative voting
AU - Meir, Reshef
N1 - Publisher Copyright: © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2016.
PY - 2016
Y1 - 2016
N2 - We cast the various different models used for the analysis of iterative voting schemes into a general framework, consistent with the literature on acyclicity in games. More specifically, we classify convergence results based on the underlying assumptions on the agent scheduler (the order of players) and the action scheduler (the response played by the agent). Our main technical result is proving that Plurality with randomized tie-breaking (which is not guaranteed to converge under arbitrary agent schedulers) is weakly-acyclic. I.e., from any initial state there is some path of better-replies to a Nash equilibrium. We thus show a separation between restricted-acyclicity and weak-acyclicity of game forms, thereby settling an open question from [17]. In addition, we refute another conjecture by showing the existence of strongly-acyclic voting rules that are not separable.
AB - We cast the various different models used for the analysis of iterative voting schemes into a general framework, consistent with the literature on acyclicity in games. More specifically, we classify convergence results based on the underlying assumptions on the agent scheduler (the order of players) and the action scheduler (the response played by the agent). Our main technical result is proving that Plurality with randomized tie-breaking (which is not guaranteed to converge under arbitrary agent schedulers) is weakly-acyclic. I.e., from any initial state there is some path of better-replies to a Nash equilibrium. We thus show a separation between restricted-acyclicity and weak-acyclicity of game forms, thereby settling an open question from [17]. In addition, we refute another conjecture by showing the existence of strongly-acyclic voting rules that are not separable.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84987950310&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-53354-3_15
DO - https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-53354-3_15
M3 - منشور من مؤتمر
SN - 9783662533536
T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
SP - 182
EP - 194
BT - Algorithmic Game Theory - 9th International Symposium, SAGT 2016, Proceedings
A2 - Gairing, Martin
A2 - Savani, Rahul
T2 - 9th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2016
Y2 - 19 September 2016 through 21 September 2016
ER -