Strategyproof Facility Location for Three Agents on a Circle

Reshef Meir

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-30473-7_2

Strategyproof Facility Location for Three Agents on a Circle

Reshef Meir

Data and Decision Sciences

Technion - Israel Institute of Technology

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

Abstract

We consider the facility location problem in a metric space, focusing on the case of three agents. We show that selecting the reported location of each agent with probability proportional to the distance between the other two agents results in a mechanism that is strategyproof in expectation, and dominates the random dictator mechanism in terms of utilitarian social welfare. We further improve the upper bound for three agents on a circle to (Formula Presented) (whereas random dictator obtains (Formula Presented) ); and provide the first lower bounds for randomized strategyproof facility location in any metric space, using linear programming.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Algorithmic Game Theory - 12th International Symposium, SAGT 2019, Proceedings
Editors	Dimitris Fotakis, Evangelos Markakis
Pages	18-33
Number of pages	16
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30473-7_2
State	Published - 2019
Event	12th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2019 - Athens, Greece Duration: 30 Sep 2019 → 3 Oct 2019

Publication series

Name	Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume	11801 LNCS

Conference

Conference	12th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2019
Country/Territory	Greece
City	Athens
Period	30/09/19 → 3/10/19

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Theoretical Computer Science
General Computer Science

Access to Document

10.1007/978-3-030-30473-7_2

Cite this

Meir, R. (2019). Strategyproof Facility Location for Three Agents on a Circle. In D. Fotakis, & E. Markakis (Eds.), Algorithmic Game Theory - 12th International Symposium, SAGT 2019, Proceedings (pp. 18-33). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 11801 LNCS). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30473-7_2

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title = "Strategyproof Facility Location for Three Agents on a Circle",

abstract = "We consider the facility location problem in a metric space, focusing on the case of three agents. We show that selecting the reported location of each agent with probability proportional to the distance between the other two agents results in a mechanism that is strategyproof in expectation, and dominates the random dictator mechanism in terms of utilitarian social welfare. We further improve the upper bound for three agents on a circle to (Formula Presented) (whereas random dictator obtains (Formula Presented) ); and provide the first lower bounds for randomized strategyproof facility location in any metric space, using linear programming.",

author = "Reshef Meir",

note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2019, Springer Nature Switzerland AG.; 12th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2019 ; Conference date: 30-09-2019 Through 03-10-2019",

year = "2019",

doi = "10.1007/978-3-030-30473-7_2",

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series = "Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)",

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Meir, R 2019, Strategyproof Facility Location for Three Agents on a Circle. in D Fotakis & E Markakis (eds), Algorithmic Game Theory - 12th International Symposium, SAGT 2019, Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 11801 LNCS, pp. 18-33, 12th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2019, Athens, Greece, 30/09/19. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30473-7_2

Strategyproof Facility Location for Three Agents on a Circle. / Meir, Reshef.
Algorithmic Game Theory - 12th International Symposium, SAGT 2019, Proceedings. ed. / Dimitris Fotakis; Evangelos Markakis. 2019. p. 18-33 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 11801 LNCS).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

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AB - We consider the facility location problem in a metric space, focusing on the case of three agents. We show that selecting the reported location of each agent with probability proportional to the distance between the other two agents results in a mechanism that is strategyproof in expectation, and dominates the random dictator mechanism in terms of utilitarian social welfare. We further improve the upper bound for three agents on a circle to (Formula Presented) (whereas random dictator obtains (Formula Presented) ); and provide the first lower bounds for randomized strategyproof facility location in any metric space, using linear programming.

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Strategyproof Facility Location for Three Agents on a Circle

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All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

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