@inproceedings{34f3ef97c38b44d7bf4b80a56bbac1e0,
title = "Strategic Voting in Negotiating Teams",
abstract = "A negotiating team is a group of two or more agents who join together as a single negotiating party because they share a common goal related to the negotiation. Since a negotiating team is composed of several stakeholders, represented as a single negotiating party, there is need for a voting rule for the team to reach decisions. In this paper, we investigate the problem of strategic voting in the context of negotiating teams. Specifically, we present a polynomial-time algorithm that finds a manipulation for a single voter when using a positional scoring rule. We show that the problem is still tractable when there is a coalition of manipulators that uses a x-approval rule. The coalitional manipulation problem becomes computationally hard when using Borda, but we provide a polynomial-time algorithm with the following guarantee: given a manipulable instance with k manipulators, the algorithm finds a successful manipulation with at most one additional manipulator. Our results hold for both constructive and destructive manipulations.",
keywords = "Manipulation, Negotiation, Voting",
author = "Leora Schmerler and Noam Hazon",
note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2021, Springer Nature Switzerland AG.; 7th International Conference on Algorithmic Decision Theory, ADT 2021 ; Conference date: 03-11-2021 Through 05-11-2021",
year = "2021",
doi = "10.1007/978-3-030-87756-9\_14",
language = "الإنجليزيّة",
isbn = "9783030877552",
series = "Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)",
publisher = "Springer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH",
pages = "209--223",
editor = "Dimitris Fotakis and \{R{\'i}os Insua\}, David",
booktitle = "Algorithmic Decision Theory - 7th International Conference, ADT 2021, Proceedings",
address = "ألمانيا",
}