Strategic Flip-Flopping in Political Competition

Gaëtan Fournier; Alberto Grillo; Yevgeny Tsodikovich

doi:10.1111/iere.12778

Strategic Flip-Flopping in Political Competition

Gaëtan Fournier, Alberto Grillo, Yevgeny Tsodikovich

Department of Economics

Ben-Gurion University of the Negev

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We study candidates' position adjustments in response to information about voters' preferences. Repositioning allows candidates to move closer to the median voter, but it incurs financial and electoral costs. In a subgame-perfect equilibrium, candidates diverge from the center ex ante if the costs of adjustment are sufficiently large. This allows them to increase the chances of a costless victory when the information is strongly in their favor. Our theory highlights a dynamic of moderation during the campaign stage in competitive elections, as well as a prominent role for minor adjustments made preemptively by the favored candidate.

Original language	American English
Journal	International Economic Review
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12778
State	Accepted/In press - 1 Jan 2025

Keywords

flip-flop
imperfect information
re-positioning
spatial voting

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Economics and Econometrics

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10.1111/iere.12778

Cite this

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title = "Strategic Flip-Flopping in Political Competition",

abstract = "We study candidates' position adjustments in response to information about voters' preferences. Repositioning allows candidates to move closer to the median voter, but it incurs financial and electoral costs. In a subgame-perfect equilibrium, candidates diverge from the center ex ante if the costs of adjustment are sufficiently large. This allows them to increase the chances of a costless victory when the information is strongly in their favor. Our theory highlights a dynamic of moderation during the campaign stage in competitive elections, as well as a prominent role for minor adjustments made preemptively by the favored candidate.",

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AU - Grillo, Alberto

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N2 - We study candidates' position adjustments in response to information about voters' preferences. Repositioning allows candidates to move closer to the median voter, but it incurs financial and electoral costs. In a subgame-perfect equilibrium, candidates diverge from the center ex ante if the costs of adjustment are sufficiently large. This allows them to increase the chances of a costless victory when the information is strongly in their favor. Our theory highlights a dynamic of moderation during the campaign stage in competitive elections, as well as a prominent role for minor adjustments made preemptively by the favored candidate.

AB - We study candidates' position adjustments in response to information about voters' preferences. Repositioning allows candidates to move closer to the median voter, but it incurs financial and electoral costs. In a subgame-perfect equilibrium, candidates diverge from the center ex ante if the costs of adjustment are sufficiently large. This allows them to increase the chances of a costless victory when the information is strongly in their favor. Our theory highlights a dynamic of moderation during the campaign stage in competitive elections, as well as a prominent role for minor adjustments made preemptively by the favored candidate.

KW - flip-flop

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KW - spatial voting

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JF - International Economic Review

ER -

Strategic Flip-Flopping in Political Competition

Abstract

Keywords

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

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