Strategic disclosure of feasible options

Geoffroy de Clippel, Kfir Eliaz

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


The paper illustrates how people who need to make a joint decision may have an incentive to withhold information regarding the existence of Pareto improving options. The resulting level of inefficiency varies with the way compromises are reached when the parties have to choose among multiple options. Various reasonable compromise rules can be ranked unequivocally, and a rule resulting in a minimal level of inefficiency is identified. Qualitative results extend to sequential disclosure. Enforcing a hard deadline for disclosure may be welfare improving in some circumstances.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)145-165
Number of pages21
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
StatePublished - 2015


  • Bargaining
  • Disclosure

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics


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