Stability and trembles in extensive-form games

Yuval Heller

doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.12.011

Stability and trembles in extensive-form games

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

A leading solution concept in the evolutionary study of extensive-form games is Selten (1983) notion of limit ESS. This note demonstrates that a limit ESS does not imply neutral stability, and that it may be dynamically unstable (almost any small perturbation takes the population away). These problems arise due to an implicit assumption that "mutants" are arbitrarily rare relative to "trembling" incumbents. Finally, I present a novel definition that solves this issue and has appealing properties.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	132-136
Number of pages	5
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	84
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.12.011
State	Published - Mar 2014
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

Evolutionary stability
Extensive-form games
Limit ESS

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

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https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.12.011

Cite this

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AB - A leading solution concept in the evolutionary study of extensive-form games is Selten (1983) notion of limit ESS. This note demonstrates that a limit ESS does not imply neutral stability, and that it may be dynamically unstable (almost any small perturbation takes the population away). These problems arise due to an implicit assumption that "mutants" are arbitrarily rare relative to "trembling" incumbents. Finally, I present a novel definition that solves this issue and has appealing properties.

KW - Evolutionary stability

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KW - Limit ESS

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DO - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.12.011

M3 - مقالة

SN - 0899-8256

VL - 84

SP - 132

EP - 136

JO - Games and Economic Behavior

JF - Games and Economic Behavior

ER -

Stability and trembles in extensive-form games

Abstract

Keywords

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Access to Document

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