Stability and auctions in labor markets with job security

Hu Fu; Robert Kleinberg; Ron Lavi; Rann Smorodinsky

doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.02.024

Stability and auctions in labor markets with job security

Hu Fu, Robert Kleinberg, Ron Lavi, Rann Smorodinsky

Data and Decision Sciences

Technion - Israel Institute of Technology

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

Fu et al. (2016) introduced a stability concept for labor markets with job security. We show that their proposed outcomes form Nash equilibria of an auction where firms compete for workers. This parallels literature on stable outcomes and similar auctions, and yields new price of anarchy bounds.

Original language	American English
Pages (from-to)	55-58
Number of pages	4
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	154
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.02.024
State	Published - 2017

Keywords

Simultaneous single-item auctions
Stable matching

UN SDGs

This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

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https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.02.024

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176517300794

Cite this

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title = "Stability and auctions in labor markets with job security",

abstract = "Fu et al. (2016) introduced a stability concept for labor markets with job security. We show that their proposed outcomes form Nash equilibria of an auction where firms compete for workers. This parallels literature on stable outcomes and similar auctions, and yields new price of anarchy bounds.",

keywords = "Simultaneous single-item auctions, Stable matching",

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AU - Lavi, Ron

AU - Smorodinsky, Rann

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N2 - Fu et al. (2016) introduced a stability concept for labor markets with job security. We show that their proposed outcomes form Nash equilibria of an auction where firms compete for workers. This parallels literature on stable outcomes and similar auctions, and yields new price of anarchy bounds.

AB - Fu et al. (2016) introduced a stability concept for labor markets with job security. We show that their proposed outcomes form Nash equilibria of an auction where firms compete for workers. This parallels literature on stable outcomes and similar auctions, and yields new price of anarchy bounds.

KW - Simultaneous single-item auctions

KW - Stable matching

U2 - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.02.024

DO - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.02.024

M3 - Article

SN - 0165-1765

VL - 154

SP - 55

EP - 58

JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

ER -

Stability and auctions in labor markets with job security

Abstract

Keywords

UN SDGs

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