Simultaneous ad auctions

Itai Ashlagi; Dov Monderer; Moshe Tennenholtz

doi:10.1287/moor.1100.0475

Simultaneous ad auctions

Itai Ashlagi, Dov Monderer, Moshe Tennenholtz

Data and Decision Sciences

Technion - Israel Institute of Technology

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We consider a model with two simultaneous VCG ad auctions A and B where each advertiser chooses to participate in a single ad auction. We prove the existence and uniqueness of a symmetric equilibrium in that model. Moreover, when the click rates in A are pointwise higher than those in B, we prove that the expected revenue in A is greater than the expected revenue in B in this equilibrium. In contrast, we show that this revenue ranking does not hold when advertisers can participate in both auctions.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	1-13
Number of pages	13
Journal	Mathematics of Operations Research
Volume	36
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1100.0475
State	Published - Feb 2011

Keywords

Ad auctions
Competition
Equilibrium
Revenue

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Computer Science Applications
General Mathematics
Management Science and Operations Research

Access to Document

10.1287/moor.1100.0475

Cite this

@article{c1e4ce87cace4bcfb328312f1a4e5657,

title = "Simultaneous ad auctions",

abstract = "We consider a model with two simultaneous VCG ad auctions A and B where each advertiser chooses to participate in a single ad auction. We prove the existence and uniqueness of a symmetric equilibrium in that model. Moreover, when the click rates in A are pointwise higher than those in B, we prove that the expected revenue in A is greater than the expected revenue in B in this equilibrium. In contrast, we show that this revenue ranking does not hold when advertisers can participate in both auctions.",

keywords = "Ad auctions, Competition, Equilibrium, Revenue",

author = "Itai Ashlagi and Dov Monderer and Moshe Tennenholtz",

year = "2011",

month = feb,

doi = "10.1287/moor.1100.0475",

language = "الإنجليزيّة",

volume = "36",

pages = "1--13",

journal = "Mathematics of Operations Research",

issn = "0364-765X",

publisher = "INFORMS Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences",

number = "1",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Simultaneous ad auctions

AU - Ashlagi, Itai

AU - Monderer, Dov

AU - Tennenholtz, Moshe

PY - 2011/2

Y1 - 2011/2

N2 - We consider a model with two simultaneous VCG ad auctions A and B where each advertiser chooses to participate in a single ad auction. We prove the existence and uniqueness of a symmetric equilibrium in that model. Moreover, when the click rates in A are pointwise higher than those in B, we prove that the expected revenue in A is greater than the expected revenue in B in this equilibrium. In contrast, we show that this revenue ranking does not hold when advertisers can participate in both auctions.

AB - We consider a model with two simultaneous VCG ad auctions A and B where each advertiser chooses to participate in a single ad auction. We prove the existence and uniqueness of a symmetric equilibrium in that model. Moreover, when the click rates in A are pointwise higher than those in B, we prove that the expected revenue in A is greater than the expected revenue in B in this equilibrium. In contrast, we show that this revenue ranking does not hold when advertisers can participate in both auctions.

KW - Ad auctions

KW - Competition

KW - Equilibrium

KW - Revenue

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=79953076670&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1287/moor.1100.0475

DO - 10.1287/moor.1100.0475

M3 - مقالة

SN - 0364-765X

VL - 36

SP - 1

EP - 13

JO - Mathematics of Operations Research

JF - Mathematics of Operations Research

IS - 1

ER -

Simultaneous ad auctions

Abstract

Keywords

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Cite this