Abstract
A statistical game is a game in which strategic interaction is mediated via a binary outcome y, coupled with a prediction problem where a characteristic x of the game may be used to predict its outcome y based on past values of (x,y). In Similarity Nash Equilibria, players combine statistical and strategic reasoning, using an estimate of y as a coordination device. They predict y by its similarity-weighted frequency and learn the optimal notion of similarity from the data. We prove that the model captures the importance of precedents and the endogenous formation of sunspots.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 354-386 |
Number of pages | 33 |
Journal | American Economic Journal: Microeconomics |
Volume | 15 |
Issue number | 3 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 2023 |
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- General Economics,Econometrics and Finance