Sequential two-prize contests

Aner Sela

doi:https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-010-0547-9

Sequential two-prize contests

Aner Sela

Department of Economics

Ben-Gurion University of the Negev

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We study a two-stage all-pay auction with two identical prizes. In each stage, the players compete for one prize. Each player may win either one or two prizes. We analyze the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium of our model with two players where each player's marginal values for the prizes are decreasing, constant, or increasing. We also analyze an equilibrium of the model with more than two players where each player's marginal values for the prizes are nonincreasing.

Original language	American English
Pages (from-to)	383-395
Number of pages	13
Journal	Economic Theory
Volume	51
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-010-0547-9
State	Published - 1 Oct 2012

Keywords

All-pay auctions
Multi-stage contests

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Economics and Econometrics

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https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-010-0547-9

Cite this

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AB - We study a two-stage all-pay auction with two identical prizes. In each stage, the players compete for one prize. Each player may win either one or two prizes. We analyze the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium of our model with two players where each player's marginal values for the prizes are decreasing, constant, or increasing. We also analyze an equilibrium of the model with more than two players where each player's marginal values for the prizes are nonincreasing.

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Sequential two-prize contests

Abstract

Keywords

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

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