@inproceedings{b5b76d2cfed948ccb5a779b92cca6c81,
title = "Selling complementary goods: Dynamics, efficiency and revenue",
abstract = "We consider a price competition between two sellers of perfect-complement goods. Each seller posts a price for the good it sells, but the demand is determined according to the sum of prices. This is a classic model by Cournot (1838), who showed that in this setting a monopoly that sells both goods is better for the society than two competing sellers. We show that non-trivial pure Nash equilibria always exist in this game. We also quantify Cournot's observation with respect to both the optimal welfare and the monopoly revenue. We then prove a series of mostly negative results regarding the convergence of best response dynamics to equilibria in such games.",
keywords = "Complements, Game theory, Networks, Price of stability, Pricing",
author = "Moshe Babaioff and Liad Blumrosen and Noam Nisan",
note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} Moshe Babaioff, Liad Blumrosen, and Noam Nisan;.; 44th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming, ICALP 2017 ; Conference date: 10-07-2017 Through 14-07-2017",
year = "2017",
month = jul,
day = "1",
doi = "https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2017.134",
language = "الإنجليزيّة",
series = "Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics, LIPIcs",
publisher = "Schloss Dagstuhl- Leibniz-Zentrum fur Informatik GmbH, Dagstuhl Publishing",
editor = "Anca Muscholl and Piotr Indyk and Fabian Kuhn and Ioannis Chatzigiannakis",
booktitle = "44th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming, ICALP 2017",
address = "ألمانيا",
}