Rules and Reasons in Law

In generations past, thinkers and preachers, rabbis and halakhists, avoided attributing reasons to commandments and halakhot. Their hesitation is rooted in various religious outlooks. According to one outlook, the reasons for commandments are beyond attainment. According to another outlook, the reasons for the commandments are irrelevant since the essence of the religious-halakhic life is servitude to God. These two outlooks are often coupled with the view that reasons undermine the force of commandments and are liable to bring about disregard for them. This leads those who adopt these outlooks to relate to commandments as entities or to view them as laws of nature that do not have—and do not need—purposes and justifications. Philosophers, jurists, and other halakhists understood matters differently. Legal rules are categorically different from laws of nature because the former are rooted in reasons, i.e., purposes and justifications. This chapter demonstrates how the understandings that arise from these philosophical discussions shed new light on the link between commandments and halakhot and their reasons. Furthermore, these understandings illustrate how halakhic claims that appear disconnected from reasons encapsulate different types of reasons. I will demonstrate these claims in various halakhic and literary contexts.