Resilient perimeter control of macroscopic fundamental diagram networks under cyberattacks

Jack Haddad, Boris Mirkin

Research output: Contribution to journalConference articlepeer-review


The perimeter control concept based on macroscopic fundamental diagram (MFD) modeling is now well-established in various literature. Recent research efforts are devoted to develop perimeter control schemes, which can be eventually applied to urban traffic control systems. Modern urban traffic control systems increasingly rely on information technology infrastructure, combining various network and physical facilities and use of communication technologies, which increases the vulnerability for cyberattacks. As witnessed in recent real-life events, modern urban traffic control systems are vulnerable and not protected from internal and external, malicious and accidental threats. Hence, applicable perimeter control algorithms should be robust not only against dynamic uncertainties, but in addition, it should be resilient against cyberattack issues for real future implementations. In this paper, a resilient perimeter control scheme is developed for a modified multi-region MFD system model. The developed perimeter control is a fully decentralized scheme, which operates based on online local regional information only. It achieves an a priori desired tracking performance with simultaneous compensation of (i) cyberattacks in the channels of control signals transmission, (ii) model parameter uncertainties, (iii) unknown but bounded disturbances, and (iv) control input constraints. A framework of adaptive control techniques is utilized to design the perimeter control. The proposed fault-tolerant perimeter control does not require on-line fault detection, as the fault effects caused by cyberattacks are continuously and adaptively compensated by the developed algorithm. Stability proof of the closed-loop system in terms of the tracking and parameter errors are introduced, and simulation results for three aggregate urban traffic regions are presented.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)56-76
Number of pages21
JournalTransportation Research Procedia
StatePublished - 2018
Event23rd International Symposium on Transportation and Traffic Theory, ISTTT 2019 - Lausanne, Switzerland
Duration: 24 Jul 201826 Jul 2018


  • Cyberattacks
  • Fully Decentralized Control
  • Macroscopic Fundamental Diagram
  • Resilient Perimeter Control

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Transportation


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