Repeated budgeted second price ad auction

Asaph Arnon, Yishay Mansour

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review


Our main goal is to abstract existing repeated sponsored search ad auction mechanisms which includes budgets, and study their equilibrium and dynamics. Our abstraction has multiple agents biding repeatedly for multiple identical items (such as impressions in an ad auction). The agents are budget limited and have a value for per item. We abstract the repeated interaction as a one-shot game, which we call budget auction, where agents submit a bid and a budget, and then items are sold by a sequential second price auction. Once an agent exhausts its budget it does not participate in the proceeding auctions. Our main result is that if agents bid conservatively (never bid above their value) then there always exists a pure Nash equilibrium. We also study simple dynamics of repeated budget auctions, showing their convergence to a Nash equilibrium for two agents and for multiple agents with identical budgets.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationAlgorithmic Game Theory - 4th International Symposium, SAGT 2011, Proceedings
Number of pages12
StatePublished - 2011
Event4th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2011 - Amalfi, Italy
Duration: 17 Oct 201119 Oct 2011

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume6982 LNCS


Conference4th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2011

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Theoretical Computer Science
  • Computer Science(all)


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