@inproceedings{2a7dbbd3989f4fd089795bbbb055f959,
title = "Regulation and double price mechanisms in markets with friction",
abstract = "In previous work we modeled the real-time power market as a dynamic system and presented an {"}efficiency-volatility{"} trade-off theorem stating that in markets with supply friction, an efficient market must have volatile prices. In this paper we introduce a novel market mechanism for power markets where there are two prices: one for the real-time power market for suppliers who have friction and another for frictionless ancillary supply with a marginal cost higher than that of regular suppliers. We show that for a given level of acceptable price volatility the double price system with the ancillary supplier is more efficient than the single price system without the frictionless ancillary supplier.",
author = "Kizilkale, {Arman C.} and Shie Mannor",
year = "2011",
doi = "10.1109/CDC.2011.6161107",
language = "الإنجليزيّة",
isbn = "9781612848006",
series = "Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control",
pages = "33--40",
booktitle = "2011 50th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control and European Control Conference, CDC-ECC 2011",
note = "2011 50th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control and European Control Conference, CDC-ECC 2011 ; Conference date: 12-12-2011 Through 15-12-2011",
}