Regulating an observable M/M/1 queue

Moshe Haviv, Binyamin Oz

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

Naor (1969) was the first to observe that in observable queues, customers' joining behavior may not coincide with the socially optimal one. The question then is how to regulate the system such that customers, while minding their own utility, will decide to join only when it is advised by society. After reviewing some existing mechanisms (some involving money transfers and some not), we suggest novel ones that do not involve money transfers and possess some advantages over the existing ones.

Original languageAmerican English
Pages (from-to)196-198
Number of pages3
JournalOperations Research Letters
Volume44
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Mar 2016

Keywords

  • Observable queue
  • Regulation of a queue
  • Strategic behavior in queue

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Software
  • Management Science and Operations Research
  • Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering
  • Applied Mathematics

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