Reevaluating the policy success of private members bills

Members of parliament routinely submit private bills. Yet, a minority of these bills are enacted. Existing research suggests that, because of the low enaction rates of private members' bills, policymaking motivation is not the primary purpose of members of parliament in submitting these bills. We question this assumption and argue that existing research examines the policy effect of Private Member Bills (PMB) too narrowly. Taking a policy process perspective, we propose, first, that a more accurate assessment of the success rate of private members' bills should look only at the bills entering the legislative process. Second, we propose that the policy effect of private members' bills should not be limited to the end result of enactment, but rather to examine their effect on the agenda-setting stage. We demonstrate these propositions using the case of private members' bills in Israel, a country that has one of the highest rates of PMBs and has institutionalized the process of evaluating them. The study provides a better understanding of private members' bills in parliamentary democracies.