Abstract
We report on the centralization of a two-sided matching-with-contracts market, in which pre-existing choice functions violate the substitutes condition. The ability to accommodate these choice functions was critical for the success of our design. The new mechanism is stable and strategy-proof for applicants. It is well accepted by both sides of the market. Our study provides a strong empirical validation for the practical relevance of recent theoretical advances on matching without substitutes.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 205-209 |
| Number of pages | 5 |
| Journal | American Economic Review |
| Volume | 107 |
| Issue number | 5 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - May 2017 |
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Economics and Econometrics
Fingerprint
Dive into the research topics of 'Redesigning the Israeli psychology Master's match'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.Cite this
- APA
- Author
- BIBTEX
- Harvard
- Standard
- RIS
- Vancouver