Redesigning the Israeli psychology Master's match

Avinatan Hassidim, Assaf Romm, Ran I. Shorrer

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

We report on the centralization of a two-sided matching-with-contracts market, in which pre-existing choice functions violate the substitutes condition. The ability to accommodate these choice functions was critical for the success of our design. The new mechanism is stable and strategy-proof for applicants. It is well accepted by both sides of the market. Our study provides a strong empirical validation for the practical relevance of recent theoretical advances on matching without substitutes.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)205-209
Number of pages5
JournalAmerican Economic Review
Volume107
Issue number5
DOIs
StatePublished - May 2017

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Redesigning the Israeli psychology Master's match'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this