Abstract
We provide a sound and complete axiomatization for a class of logics appropriate for reasoning about the rationality of players in games, and show that essentially the same axiomatization applies to a very wide class of decision rules. We also consider games in which players may be uncertain as to what decision rules their opponents are using, and define in this context a new solution concept, D-rationalizability.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 146-164 |
Number of pages | 19 |
Journal | Games and Economic Behavior |
Volume | 104 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 1 Jul 2017 |
Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- Axiomatization
- Decision rules
- Epistemic game theory
- Rationality
- Rationalizability
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Finance
- Economics and Econometrics