Abstract
We prove that every multiplayer quitting game admits a sunspot ε-equilibrium for every ε > 0, that is, an ε-equilibrium in an extended game in which the players observe a public signal at every stage. We also prove that, if a certain matrix that is derived from the payoffs in the game is not a Q-matrix in the sense of linear complementarity problems, then the game admits a uniform ε-equilibrium for every ε > 0.
Original language | English |
---|---|
Pages (from-to) | 434-454 |
Number of pages | 21 |
Journal | Mathematics of Operations Research |
Volume | 45 |
Issue number | 2 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - May 2020 |
Keywords
- Linear complementarity problems
- Q-matrices
- Quitting games
- Stochastic games
- Stopping games
- Sunspot equilibrium
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Computer Science Applications
- General Mathematics
- Management Science and Operations Research