Abstract
We study the query complexity of approximate notions of Nash equilibrium in games with a large number of players n. Our main result states that for n-player binary-action games and for constant ε, the query complexity of an ε-well-supported Nash equilibrium is exponential in n. As a consequence of this result, we get an exponential lower bound on the rate of convergence of adaptive dynamics to approximate Nash equilibria.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Article number | 36 |
| Journal | Journal of the ACM |
| Volume | 63 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - 1 Oct 2016 |
Keywords
- Adaptive dynamics
- Approximate Nash equilibrium
- Convergence and learning in games
- Exact and approximate computation of equilibria
- F.2.0 [analysis of algorithms and problem complexity]: general
- Query complexity
- Rate of convergence
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Software
- Control and Systems Engineering
- Information Systems
- Hardware and Architecture
- Artificial Intelligence
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