Query complexity of approximate Nash equilibria

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Abstract

We study the query complexity of approximate notions of Nash equilibrium in games with a large number of players n and a constant number of actions m. Our main result states that even for constant ε, the query complexity of an ε-well-supported Nash equilibrium is exponential in n.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationSTOC 2014 - Proceedings of the 2014 ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing
Pages535-544
Number of pages10
DOIs
StatePublished - 2014
Externally publishedYes
Event4th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC 2014 - New York, NY, United States
Duration: 31 May 20143 Jun 2014

Publication series

NameProceedings of the Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing

Conference

Conference4th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC 2014
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityNew York, NY
Period31/05/143/06/14

Keywords

  • Adaptive dynamics
  • Approximate Nash equilibrium
  • Fixed point
  • Query complexity
  • Rate of convergence

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Software

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