Query complexity of approximate Nash equilibria

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We study the query complexity of approximate notions of Nash equilibrium in games with a large number of players n. Our main result states that for n-player binary-action games and for constant ε, the query complexity of an ε-well-supported Nash equilibrium is exponential in n. As a consequence of this result, we get an exponential lower bound on the rate of convergence of adaptive dynamics to approximate Nash equilibria.

Original languageEnglish
Article number36
JournalJournal of the ACM
Issue number4
StatePublished - 1 Oct 2016


  • Adaptive dynamics
  • Approximate Nash equilibrium
  • Convergence and learning in games
  • Exact and approximate computation of equilibria
  • F.2.0 [analysis of algorithms and problem complexity]: general
  • Query complexity
  • Rate of convergence

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Software
  • Control and Systems Engineering
  • Information Systems
  • Hardware and Architecture
  • Artificial Intelligence


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