Proxy Manipulation for Better Outcomes

Gili Bielous, Reshef Meir

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review


This paper offers a framework for the study of strategic behavior in proxy voting, where non-active voters delegate their votes to active voters. It further studies how proxy voting affects the strategic behavior of non-active voters and proxies (active voters) under complete and partial information. We focus on the median voting rule for single-peaked preferences. Our results show strategyproofness with respect to non-active voters. Furthermore, while strategyproofness does not extend to proxies, we show that under mild restrictions strategic behavior can lead to socially optimal outcomes. For partial information settings, our results show that while convergence is guaranteed, it may be sub-optimal.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationMulti-Agent Systems - 19th European Conference, EUMAS 2022, Proceedings
EditorsDorothea Baumeister, Jörg Rothe
PublisherSpringer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH
Number of pages17
ISBN (Print)9783031206139
StatePublished - 2022
Event19th European Conference on Multi-Agent Systems, EUMAS 2022 - Düsseldorf, Germany
Duration: 14 Sep 202216 Sep 2022

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume13442 LNAI


Conference19th European Conference on Multi-Agent Systems, EUMAS 2022


  • Computational social choice
  • Proxy voting
  • Strategic voting
  • Strategyproofness

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Theoretical Computer Science
  • General Computer Science


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