Abstract

We analyze repeated games in which players have private information about their levels of patience and in which they would like to maintain the privacy of this information vis-à-vis third parties. We show that privacy protection in the form of shielding players’ actions from outside observers is harmful, as it limits and sometimes eliminates the possibility of attaining Pareto-optimal payoffs.

Original languageAmerican English
Pages (from-to)759-784
Number of pages26
JournalDynamic Games and Applications
Volume11
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 2021

Keywords

  • Perception games
  • Privacy
  • Privacy protection
  • Signaling games

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Statistics and Probability
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Computer Science Applications
  • Computer Graphics and Computer-Aided Design
  • Computational Theory and Mathematics
  • Computational Mathematics
  • Applied Mathematics

Cite this