@inproceedings{797f3b67781d4963a0ae433189f8c899,
title = "Pricing multi-unit markets",
abstract = "We study the power and limitations of posted prices in multi-unit markets, where agents arrive sequentially in an arbitrary order. We prove upper and lower bounds on the largest fraction of the optimal social welfare that can be guaranteed with posted prices, under a range of assumptions about the designer{\textquoteright}s information and agents{\textquoteright} valuations. Our results provide insights about the relative power of uniform and non-uniform prices, the relative difficulty of different valuation classes, and the implications of different informational assumptions. Among other results, we prove constant-factor guarantees for agents with (symmetric) subadditive valuations, even in an incomplete-information setting and with uniform prices.",
author = "Tomer Ezra and Michal Feldman and Tim Roughgarden and Warut Suksompong",
note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2018.; 14th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics, WINE 2018 ; Conference date: 15-12-2018 Through 17-12-2018",
year = "2018",
doi = "10.1007/978-3-030-04612-5_10",
language = "الإنجليزيّة",
isbn = "9783030046118",
series = "Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)",
publisher = "Springer Verlag",
pages = "140--153",
editor = "Tobias Harks and George Christodoulou",
booktitle = "Web and Internet Economics - 14th International Conference, WINE 2018, Proceedings",
address = "ألمانيا",
}